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It was very soon apparent that the global economic crisis of 2008–09, aside from its painful 
economic costs, also raised fears of worrisome prospects for the smooth and harmonious conduct 
of international policymaking. As has been seen in other large recessions and depressions in 
times past, it was not long before new policy initiatives started to emerge that placed national 
concerns at the forefront, even if that went against the grain of seemingly established principles, 
worked against globalization, irritated specific economic partners, or undermined international 
economic cooperation more broadly. Whether in fiscal and monetary policies, the control of 
currencies and capital flows, approaches to protectionism and barriers to trade, or in the 
regulation of finance, national economic interests are starting to be asserted, often at the expense 
of commitments (explicit or implicit) to preserve the integration of world markets and to solve 
problems through cooperative policy actions. 
Several broad questions thus began to resonate among scholars, policymakers, and 
economic actors. Is globalization in retreat? What are the economic causes, political channels, 
and ultimate consequences of these changes? And how can applied economic research (based on 
theory, history, and empirics) respond to the challenge of making sense of these developments 
and offer wise counsel for the future? 
Prompted by these historic shocks to the global order, and the damage and uncertainty 




major questions that need to be faced going forwards. We saw that there was little in the way of 
new analytical frameworks for considering such questions in light of current events. We felt 
there was an acute need to consider some of the critical linkages between many of the pressing 
issues (for example, exchange rates, global imbalances, and financial regulation). We also saw 
the need for thinking that embraced the long sweep of history and considered the political and 
economic outcome of past multilateral economic policies, and the prospective role of such 
policies in the future path of the global economy. 
The goal was to advance debate about how the mostly successful multilateral post-WWII 
global economic order should not merely continue to function, but also now evolve and improve 
to address the strains created by the pressures of rapid globalization in the last two decades, and 
now deeply exposed and exacerbated by the crisis. Whilst there are ongoing processes and 
institutions in each sphere (e.g., Doha round, UN, IMF/G-20, Basel), “blue sky” thinking on new 
agendas for the next century could bring research directly to policymakers in ways that are useful 
to them. The nine papers gathered here, with comments from leading policy makers, are intended 
to be a first, important step towards this end. 
 
Lessons from History 
The proceedings begin with two papers that take the long view. International cooperation on 
economic matters on a significant scale dates back to the nineteenth century. The best known 
example was just about 150 years ago, when Britain and France concluded the Cobden-Chevalier 
trade treaty of 1860 which formalized the “most favored nation” (MFN) concept, thus extending 
tariff reductions by any pair of countries to other partners within the growing web of similar 




become restrictive at times, notably in the interwar period, the same principle was later revived 
and has been central to the operation and success of GATT/WTO in the postwar era. 
  In monetary affairs, the launch of the Latin Monetary Union in 1866 by France, Belgium, 
Italy, and Switzerland (later joined by 7 other countries) could be seen as, if not an early 
precursor to the Eurozone, at least an attempt to coordinate monetary policy at a transnational 
level, even if the project was soon undermined by the contradictions of the bimetallic system it 
sought to defend, and the bloc ended up as a de facto member of the soon ubiquitous gold 
standard area which began to dominate world monetary affairs after the 1870s. Indeed, the gold 
standard itself may also stand in, for some, as a better example of a multilateral system of 
monetary cooperation. It depended for its smooth functioning on adherence, within limits, to 
certain policies and rules in a decentralized context, and on its ability to deliver price stability; 
ultimately it failed when, in the 1930s, non-cooperative behavior in a deflationary environment 
tore it apart. 
  Against this backdrop, the first two chapters use the tools of comparative economic 
history to survey the variety of institutional formats, policy experiments, and their associated 
economic outcomes over the last two centuries, drawing attention to the successes and failures, 
the political economy forces driving the historical process, and, most importantly, drawing out 
lessons for our present post-crisis challenges. 
  In Chapter 1, “Coping with Shocks and Shifts: The Multilateral Trading System in 
Historical Perspective,” Douglas Irwin and Kevin O’Rourke present a panoramic view of the 
multilateral trading system over the last two post-mercantilist centuries, and explore how its 
sustainability in different historical epochs has depended on its ability to cope with disruptive 




absorbers capable of handling large macroeconomic, financial, or political disturbances, the 
trading system has proven to lack resilience, in the sense that political economy forces have then 
tended to emerge intent on using protectionist devices as an alternative tool to offset, or at least 
cushion, such shocks. But equally important, lower frequency perturbations (“shifts”) have also 
from time to time strained the commitment to free trade, as when more gradual but no less 
powerful trends in comparative advantage (whether for technological or geopolitical or other 
reasons) have eventually forced dramatic changes in trade patterns, industry structure, and factor 
rewards, creating a political backlash. They also argue that institutions matter: even if unilateral 
policymaking could in theory deliver a free trading system with adequate shock absorbers, 
historical observation of such regimes expose the perils of beggar-they-neighbor actions and a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome. The parallels with the present are clear, and whether we think at 
the level of the prospective fallout from a possible Eurozone crisis or the dim prospects for 
further progress in the WTO/Doha process, or how trade with emergent China and India has and 
will yet affect the advanced countries, the paper draws attention to the important but often 
neglected linkages between the sustainable success of free trade regimes and the political and 
technocratic ability of countries to manage the pressures that openness exposes. 
  In Chapter 2, “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Cooperation in History,” Barry Eichengreen 
takes a long view of the evolution of international coordination in macroeconomic policy areas. 
The historical record shows a great deal of variation, and in general suggests that there are often 
constraints on what can be achieved, probably more so than in the area of trade policy: 
coordination is more likely in limited technical areas, when there is institutional support, when it 
is needed to preserve an existing regime from failure, and when nations are not in conflict on 




mutual support operation, often of a technical nature, and although policymakers had not overtly 
created the regime, once it was there they increasingly had a stake in its continued smooth 
operation. It was the outbreak of war in 1914 that derailed the gold standard, and despite 
desperate efforts made in the 1920s to try to rebuild and shore up a patched up version 
augmented with reserve currencies, its credibility was weakened as much by increased scarcity 
of gold as by decreased good will. Only in the wake of these failures, and the Depression and a 
second war, did more serious efforts take hold as conflict abated and the costs of earlier mistakes 
loomed large, with the creation of the IMF and, following the Marshall Plan, the start of 
European cooperation ultimately leading to the EU and EMU. Nonetheless, as financial 
integration progressed in the late twentieth centuries, more often than not it would take crises-- 
some severe -- to prompt coordinated actions even where institutional structures were in place; 
examples of reactive rather than proactive efforts being responses to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
global imbalances, the Great Recession, and notably Europe’s attempts to shore up monetary and 
fiscal arrangements after a crisis, be it in 1992 or today. In these cases, the gaps between the 
technocratic solutions and political realities, in the U.S., Europe, China, or elsewhere, have often 
been a key stumbling block. Facing a global disaster in 2008–09, central bank and G20 
cooperation showed that grave enough dangers could focus minds, but once the cliff edge 
receded problems of collective action resurfaced. International macroeconomic cooperation 
remains as fragile as ever. 
 
Trade and Environment 
In Chapter 3, “Can the Doha Round be a Development Round? Setting a Place at the Table,” 




progress for more than ten years) can really deliver on one of its main stated objectives, namely 
improving the trading prospects of developing countries. They argue that certain features in the 
design of the current round, as well as a number of path-dependent conditions inherited from past 
trade rounds, may make this objective difficult to attain. First, they note that the attempt to 
maintain a “special and differential treatment” (SDT) regime in the negotiations for developing 
countries — that is, an exception to the usual norm of reciprocity as in the case of developed 
countries — may prove to be a significant barrier to the achievement of successful negotiations. 
Qualitatively, by trying to free ride on others’ MFN commitments, the SDT provision may limit 
the “voice” of these countries in deciding which products actually get included in liberalization; 
and quantitatively, theory shows that the reciprocity between a pair of developed countries can 
induce terms of trade changes which, though mutually beneficial for them, in the end, leave the 
developing country with no change in trade volume. Lerner symmetry proves to be strong under 
reciprocal MFN tariff bargaining: the tariff cut boosts exports for the negotiating pair, but not for 
the outsider. Worse still, the developing countries face the problem of being “latecomers” to such 
negotiations, meaning that developed nations have already removed (and given MFN status) to 
tariff cuts on a wide range of manufactured goods: but in reciprocal bargaining, where “large” 
sectors feel the pain of foreign tariffs, the political process and bargaining equilibrium depends 
on the ability to identify such potential gains on both sides. If developed countries have 
eliminated most such distortions already then a mutually beneficial deal is harder to find, and 
history reveals evidence of such problems even in the early postwar GATT rounds.  
Another design problem in the Doha round concerns agriculture, where the setup tries to 
encourage reductions in home agricultural subsidies in exchange for partner import tariff cuts. 




“optimal” (in the terms of trade sense) and if the agricultural subsidy makes their food imports 
cheaper, the proposed deal may appear lose-lose for the partner; in the home country, farmers 
lose subsidies and might gain on exports, but the net effect might be ambiguous. In this setting, 
unlike symmetric market-access bargaining over tariffs, the gains may be small, hard to identify, 
or nonexistent. Thus, the authors conclude, significant changes in the design on the Doha round 
may be needed if negotiations, stalled for a decade, are to move forward. 
  In Chapter 4, “Preferential Trade Agreements and the World Trade System: A 
Multilateralist View,” Pravin Krishna considers the long-standing trend of creating 
discriminatory regional or bilateral preferential trade agreements (or PTAs, such as free trade 
areas, customs unions, etc.) and assesses to what extent this process is compatible with a healthy 
multilateral world trading system: that is, one might ask, are the two substitutes or complements? 
To answer this question is, ultimately, an empirical challenge, but with two decades of 
experience since the proliferation of such agreements began on a large scale, we have a reached a 
moment when a reasonable assessment can be made using evidence drawn from a broad sample 
of experiences. The results are mixed, but they suggest that PTAs are, as yet, a big factor. PTAs 
currently cover only a small fraction of trade in terms of the actual amount of liberalization 
achieved (that is, above and beyond multilateral agreements): most PTA trade takes places under 
zero MFN tariffs. Intra-PTA trade shares are small in most cases, and studies find that the 
welfare impacts are not clear cut. In addition, the institutional aspects of “deep integration” do 
not seem to be advanced all that much by PTAs relative to WTO norms. It is not clear that 
preferential agreements can impair the multilateral negotiation process in general, but there are 
signs that PTA members may use subtle yet diversionary nontariff trade policy more 




many cases significant instances of trade diversion resulting from such preferential deals, so they 
do have some impact at the margin. In addition, as noted in the previous chapter, the sequencing 
of market access to developed countries via special preferences for some developing countries 
can vary considerably and those with existing access may have very divergent interests 
compared to those who have no deal in place, a factor which could complicate deal making in the 
WTO process. The conclusion drawn is that PTAs have not achieved as much as might be 
thought, and that the multilateral process has been, and remains, central to the trade liberalization 
process. 
  In Chapter 5, “Trade and Industrialization after Globalization’s Second Unbundling: How 
Building and Joining a Supply Chain are Different and Why it Matters,” Richard Baldwin asks 
why so-called high development theory has thus far failed to give a plausible account of how 
emerging poorer countries can succeed in growth and development, and narrow the divergence in 
income per capita or productivity between themselves and the rich world. On the one hand, he 
argues that the actual experience of the last two decades has only served to emphasize the 
shortcomings of older generations of theories, but that distinct transformations in the workings of 
trade created by today’s globalization may serve as the foundations of a newer and more accurate 
theory. The key, he argues, is to note that in its previous workings, the globalization of trade only 
enabled a “first unbundling” via the separation of the locales of production and consumption, 
notably after the revolutionary decline in shipping costs in the nineteenth century; this naturally 
led to highly localized and specialized production as predicted in old trade theories, and led to 
the division of the world into manufacturers and non-manufacturers. Once it was technologically 
feasible and economically worthwhile, the factories were “unbundled” from consumers. But the 




where the different parts of the manufacturing process can be split up and along with it, the 
location of one or more intermediate steps of value creation. Baldwin argues that this “second 
unbundling,” facilitated by even lower transport costs and other logistical developments (like 
ICT and the internet), is as revolutionary as the first, if not more so. Creating such niche 
opportunities can allow all countries to compete for a slice of manufacturing on a more even 
playing field: for example, instead of requiring an entire and “lumpy” vertically-structured 
automobile industry, built on a huge manufacturing base ranging from basic inputs and parts all 
the way up to final assembly, the supply chain allows many different value added slices to be 
produced in myriad locations. Now that it is technologically feasible and economically 
worthwhile, the factories themselves are being unbundled. Baldwin sketches this out as a new 
development theory which could explain the much more rapid (and disruptive) ability of 
emerging countries today to compete and converge with rich countries. 
  In Chapter 6, “Facing the Climate Change Challenge in a Global Economy,” Lee 
Branstetter and William Pizer discuss the global economic challenge posed by mitigating the 
predicted adverse economic and ecological effects of climate change in the decades to come. 
Evidence suggests that we are already behind the curve, in that the ongoing stocks and flows of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are so substantial as to have already placed us 
on a trajectory far worse than the agreed and supposedly achievable targets that have been the 
focus of past international negotiations and treaties. This reflects the historical problems in this 
domain, where progress from declared objectives to substantive economic policy action has 
moved at a glacial pace—problems that, in turn, reflect the problems of intergenerational and 
transnational collective action. The first problem is that the full, cumulative benefits of 




degree, uncertain; and the second is that, unlike most “local” pollution forms, GHG is by its 
nature afflicted by a global externality problem, but we live in a world where the locus of 
political decisions is national. The latter problem is exacerbated by the fact that a large share of 
future emissions growth will be in latecomer emerging economies, for whom sacrificing 
economic growth will appear not just costly but inequitable, in that the advanced economies past 
stock of emissions was not so restrained. In light of these problems, the authors discuss potential 
policy solutions to the climate change problems we face, and why current global institutions will 
face certain challenges. For the moment they conclude that negotiations based on “top down” 
global approaches, like the Kyoto Protocol, may not be fruitful in the near term, although some 
progress may yet be made in “bottom up” frameworks where countries, or perhaps regions, may 
implement mitigation commitments more unilaterally. However, if such policies progress at 
different speeds, comparative advantage could shift, with the possibility of “carbon tariff” 
policies that protect costly and cleaner energy-using sectors at home from cheap and dirty 
producers in overseas havens with weaker pollution controls. Whilst in theory such trade barriers 
might be economically suited to solving the externality problem, they are likely to be politically 
problematic and could create serious trade tensions for the global economy. 
 
Macroeconomics and Finance 
In Chapter 7, “Multilateral Economic Cooperation: The Role of Fiscal Policy,” Giancarlo 
Corsetti and Gernot Müller consider the case for fiscal policy coordination across countries, an 
aspect of macroeconomic policy that has been thrust into the spotlight since the start of the Great 
Recession once conventional monetary policies reached their limits. Indeed, the global response 




can be achieved, above and beyond the automatic stabilizers. But even if it is feasible, can it be 
argued to be effective? And in particular, are international spillovers large enough to matter and 
to justify treating this as a potential coordination problem? The authors attack this question using 
both theory and empirics. Empirically they use a vector-autoregression model with US and 
European/UK data, and find evidence that, using standard identification methods, US fiscal 
shocks do generate quite large spillovers across the Atlantic. To try to explain this, the 
theoretical model is a fairly standard quantitative two-country business cycle model, with 
nominal rigidities, a Taylor rule monetary policy, and fiscal policy guided by a debt-stabilizing 
rule for taxes and spending (so deficits today imply reversals in the future). In this setup it is 
quite hard to generate large cross-border spillovers, although qualitatively the impacts are 
present. But the model highlights that the “financial channel” matters, so that anticipated future 
reversals of policy can deliver lower interest rates in the present. Still, in this setting, any doubts 
about solvency would undermine the mechanism, implying that sovereign stresses in various 
countries could undermine the power of fiscal policy tools, and in that case international 
coordination to create “fiscal space” could be needed to ensure that truly solvent countries avoid 
self-fulfilling sovereign crises. 
  In Chapter 8, “The International Monetary System: Living with Asymmetry,” Maurice 
Obstfeld examines the problems facing the international monetary system as a result of the 
growing asymmetry between advanced and emerging nations, which in many key respects echo 
the travails of the late Bretton Woods System in the 1960s. For one, in an increasingly 
financially integrated world, where capital controls cannot be perfectly watertight, emerging 
countries facing the threat of sudden stops (or sudden flight) of capital, unwilling or unable to 




foreign reserve hoarding in order to maintain a liquidity buffer. At the same time, many of these 
countries also have “fear of floating” and wish to limit exchange rate volatility through 
intervention to support currency regimes that range from dirty floats to firm pegs, possibly for 
competitive export reasons, and/or to avoid boom-bust economic cycles associated with 
speculative capital inflows and currency overshooting. The author argues that at a fundamental 
level, this configuration of the world economy is most likely inefficient, resulting from 
coordination failures and institutional weaknesses. For example, a narrow and rational interest in 
self-insurance can lead a country to develop a huge war chest of foreign AAA reserve assets, but 
this creates a negative externality; clearly, not every country can pursue this strategy, and the 
pool of safe assets is increasingly limited on the supply side, exploding on the demand side. 
Indeed, the configuration may self-destruct if a fiscal variant of the 1960s Triffin Paradox 
eventually undercuts the creditworthiness of the shrinking set of safe haven governments, as they 
either lever up non-deficit finance (gross debt) for risk transformation, or over-borrow with 
deficit finance (net debt) for current expenditures. Moreover, this asymmetry problem is likely to 
be exacerbated by the growth acceleration in emerging countries relative to advanced economies 
of late. Gross foreign asset positions have thus expanded on both sides of the emerging-
developed country divide, but with very different compositions, resulting in risk shifting more 
than risk sharing. And within the advanced world, the explosion of gross foreign asset positions 
has already been problematic, with the foreign-currency components held on bank balance sheets 
requiring cross-border lender of last resort action during the recent crisis (routed through central 
bank swap lines). The chapter then goes on to discuss how these problems could be addressed by 
more effective multilateral cooperation: redesigning the role of lenders of last resort nationally 




countries to access emergency liquidity than costly and potentially destabilizing reserve 
accumulation; coordinating emerging countries’ exchange rate policies to avoid currency wars; 
the ways in which the IMF could support these goals with enlarged facilities, redesigned 
conditionality, oversight of capital flow imbalances, and emerging country currency and capital 
control surveillance; and the deep political challenge posed by the risk of communal fiscal losses 
in any such cross-country risk sharing architecture in cases where illiquidity turns out to be 
insolvency. 
  The volume concludes with Chapter 9, “Global Macroeconomic and Financial 
Supervision: Where Next?” by Charles Goodhart. This chapter argues that there are two key 
challenges to further progress in improving oversight, one political and one analytical. The 
political problem is the clash between national sovereignty and policymaking and the 
international cross-border linkages brought about by the unprecedented degree of financial 
globalization in the last decade. The analytical problem is that macroeconomics has made slow 
progress, with little consensus: models of financial sectors with plausible frictions, 
incompleteness, or imperfections, are as of now still in their infancy. On the former, the prospect 
of any global governance structure is remote, so Goodhart argues that after the crisis, we should 
expect to see more national-level control and supervision over finance. A key testing ground is 
the Euro area, where the treaty commitments to capital mobility are forcing, belatedly, rapid 
efforts to create cross-border supervisory structures. Yet key architectural problems stand in the 
way, such as the lack of a fiscal system to back the monetary union, a sluggish and asymmetric 
adjustment mechanism between surplus and deficit regions, no well-articulated lender of last 
resort role for the ECB, the national nature of most banks, and the fact that such banks 




moments of financial crisis and downturn, a subsidiary sovereign may be faced with self-
fulfilling bank or sovereign crises, and the one may cause the other (given the co-dependence 
caused by the public debt on bank balance sheets). On the macro side, the author argues that to 
prevent or mitigate crises, some authorities, most likely the IMF, may need to be more assertive 
in warning about debt-augmenting imbalances ex ante, or even dissuading them by issuing 
binding risk-weighting changes. And, once solvency is the issue, the IMF or some other arbiter 
may need greater powers in helping quickly resolve crises and restructure debts ex post. On the 
banking side, the author notes that, despite major changes since the 1980s, the crisis shows that 
the Basel banking regime remains a work in progress, with serious shortcomings evident in the 
laxness and pro-cyclicality of the current rules. Weaknesses remain in that the regime has no 
sanctions and defers to nations, that the safe capital ratios may be higher than the current 
minima, that other tools such as convertible bonds or taxation remain unexplored, and that risk-
weighting and stress test concepts are still in play despite their dubious value in the last crisis. 
Thus, the tasks ahead for macro-prudential policy design remain challenging. 
 